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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #00567-85
1 February 1985

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting

1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 28 January 1985 to consider the attached subjects.

2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on 20 February 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Recommendations for discussions/warning topics will be forwarded to the NIO/East Asia by COB 8 February 1985. I would advise those attending from outside agencies to arrive early to avoid parking problems created by construction work. For your convenience, please enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123 Entrance. Please phone attendance intentions to [redacted] and have your clearances verified to us by your security office by C.O.B. 12 February 1985.

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Attachment:
28 January 1985 Warning Meeting

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28 January 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting

The Assistant NIO opened the meeting by introducing Mr. Lyall Breckon, State Department Country Director for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Breckon provided an overview of policymakers' concerns in Southeast Asia, praised areas of Community production (including current intelligence support), and identified areas wherein policymakers needed more support. Mr. Breckon specifically praised the Community for its detailed coverage of the current border situation and developments in that area. Having served in several Southeast Asia countries, he acknowledged the difficulty of collecting the hard intelligence information decisionmakers always seemed to want.

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During the question and answer period following his presentation, discussion focused on POW-MIA negotiations between the US and Vietnam; the impact of China's non-reaction to attacks on KPNLF bases; [redacted]

[redacted] and the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Kampuchea problem and the establishment of a credible alternative government in Cambodia.

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Vietnam's dry season campaign to date has developed as predicted. Advance preparations and additional forces, brought in to the area during the wet season have allowed Vietnam to conduct a vigorous and wide-ranging campaign against insurgent bases along the Thai border. There is every expectation that attacks soon will take place against remaining DK bases. The bases of Prince Sihanouk may temporarily be spared until Vietnam sees if Sihanouk might be willing to participate in a negotiated settlement. However, given Sihanouk's recent vacillations, his bases also could be overrun during the latter stages of the dry season campaign.

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There is a question of Vietnam's staying power, however, the development of an extensive logistics infrastructure and the extensive use of corvee labor behind the lines to develop road networks [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] suggests that Vietnam is prepared to pay the price of staying near the border after the dry season ends. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

We believe that the primary objective of this campaign by Vietnam is to show ASEAN that the insurgency will not work and that a negotiated settlement must be reached. Vietnam appears to believe that by achieving a fundamental military advantage throughout the area, they will leave ASEAN only with the option of a negotiated settlement.

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Forecast:

During the remainder of the dry season, we expect to see Vietnam maintain the pace of action on the border and increase counterinsurgent activities in the interior.

We expect this dry season campaign to mark a down-turn in KPNLF fortunes. KPNLF inability to forcefully react against attacks by Vietnam and PRK has raised serious doubts concerning leadership effectiveness training programs, and dedication of personnel. We expect to see calls for improved/new leadership. We doubt, however, that the KPNLF has the instinct to take on the Vietnamese in a systematic manner. In the near term, discipline among the non-communist forces will remain ragged; they are unlikely to stage any significant comeback this dry season, or during the coming wet season; the reestablishment of bases inside Cambodia also appears problematical at this time.

While the number of refugees forced into Thailand will be a logistics problem for the Thais, it probably will not present a major political problem, other than in the context of reinforcing Vietnam's point that a negotiated settlement will be the only way that the refugees will be permitted to return to Cambodia.

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